1. Nan-kwo Sze-khî 2 was seated, leaning forward on his stool. He was looking up to heaven and breathed gently, seeming to be in a trance, and to have lost all consciousness of any companion. (His disciple), Yen Khäng Dze-yû 3, who was in attendance and standing before him, said, 'What is this? Can the body be made to become thus like a withered tree, and the mind to become like slaked lime? His appearance as he leans forward on the stool to-day is such as I never saw him have before in the same position.' Dze-khî said, 'Yen, you do well to ask such a question, I had just now lost myself 4; but how should you understand it? You
may have heard the notes 1 of Man, but have not heard those of Earth; you may have heard the notes of Earth, but have not heard those of Heaven.'
Dze-yû said, 'I venture to ask from you a description of all these.' The reply was, 'When the breath of the Great Mass (of nature) comes strongly, it is called Wind. Sometimes it does not come so; but when it does, then from a myriad apertures there issues its excited noise;--have you not heard it in a prolonged gale? Take the projecting bluff of a mountain forest;--in the great trees, a hundred spans round, the apertures and cavities are like the nostrils, or the mouth, or the ears; now square, now round like a cup or a mortar; here like a wet footprint, and there like a large puddle. (The sounds issuing from them are like) those of fretted water, of the arrowy whizz, of the stern command, of the inhaling of the breath, of the shout, of the gruff note, of the deep wail, of the sad and piping note. The first notes are slight, and those that follow deeper, but in harmony with them. Gentle winds produce a small response; violent winds a great one. When the fierce gusts have passed away, all the apertures
are empty (and still);--have you not seen this in the bending and quivering of the branches and leaves?'
Dze-yû said, 'The notes of Earth then are simply those which come from its myriad apertures; and the notes of Man may just be compared to those which (are brought from the tubes of) bamboo;--allow me to ask about the notes of Heaven 1.' Dze-khî replied, 'When (the wind) blows, (the sounds from) the myriad apertures are different, and (its cessation) makes them stop of themselves. Both of these things arise from (the wind and the apertures) themselves:--should there be any other agency that excites them?'
2. Great knowledge is wide and comprehensive; small knowledge is partial and restricted. Great speech is exact and complete; small speech is (merely) so much talk 2. When we sleep, the soul communicates with (what is external to us); when we awake, the body is set free. Our intercourse with others then leads to various activity, and daily there is the striving of mind with mind. There are hesitancies; deep difficulties; reservations; small apprehensions causing restless distress, and great
apprehensions producing endless fears. Where their utterances are like arrows from a bow, we have those who feel it their charge to pronounce what is right and what is wrong.; where they are given out like the conditions of a covenant, we have those who maintain their views, determined to overcome. (The weakness of their arguments), like the decay (of things) in autumn and winter, shows the failing (of the minds of some) from day to day; or it is like their water which, once voided, cannot be gathered up again. Then their ideas seem as if fast bound with cords, showing that the mind is become like an old and dry moat, and that it is nigh to death, and cannot be restored to vigour and brightness.
Joy and anger, sadness and pleasure, anticipation and regret, fickleness and fixedness, vehemence and indolence, eagerness and tardiness;--(all these moods), like music from an empty tube, or mushrooms from the warm moisture, day and night succeed to one another and come before us, and we do not know whence they sprout. Let us stop! Let us stop! Can we expect to find out suddenly how they are produced?
If there were not (the views of) another, I should not have mine; if there were not I (with my views), his would be uncalled for:--this is nearly a true, statement of the case, but we do not know what it is that makes it be so. It might seem as if there would be a true Governor 1 concerned in it, but we do not find
any trace (of his presence and acting). That such an One could act so I believe; but we do not see His form. He has affections, but He has no form.
Given the body, with its hundred parts, its nine openings, and its six viscera, all complete in their places, which do I love the most? Do you love them all equally? or do you love some more than others? Is it not the case that they all perform the part of your servants and waiting women? All of them being such, are they not incompetent to rule one another? or do they take it in turns to be now ruler and now servants? There must be a true Ruler (among them) 1 whether by searching you can find out His character or not, there is neither advantage nor hurt, so far as the truth of His operation is concerned. When once we have received the bodily form complete, its parts do not fail to perform their functions till the end comes. In conflict with things or in harmony with them, they pursue their course to the end, with the speed of a galloping horse which cannot be stopped;--is it not sad? To be constantly toiling all one's lifetime, without seeing the fruit of one's labour, and to be weary and worn out with his labour, without knowing where he is going to:--is it not a deplorable case? Men may say, 'But it is not death;' yet of what advantage is this? When the body is decomposed, the mind will be the same along with it:--must not the case be pronounced very deplorable 2? Is the life
of man indeed enveloped in such darkness? Is it I alone to whom it appears so? And does it not appear to be so to other men?
3. If we were to follow the judgments of the predetermined mind, who would be left alone and without a teacher 1? Not only would it be so with those who know the sequences (of knowledge and feeling) and make their own selection among them, but it would be so as well with the stupid and unthinking. For one who has not this determined mind, to have his affirmations and negations is like the case described in the saying, 'He went to Yüeh to-day, and arrived at it yesterday 2.' It would be making what was not a fact to be a fact. But even the spirit-like Yü 3 could not have known how to do this, and how should one like me be able to do it?
But speech is not like the blowing (of the wind) the speaker has (a meaning in) his words. If, however, what he says, be indeterminate (as from a mind not made up), does he then really speak or not? He thinks that his words are different from the chirpings of fledgelings; but is there any distinction between them or not? But how can the Tâo be so obscured, that there should be 'a True' and 'a False' in it? How can speech be so obscured that there should be 'the Right' and 'the Wrong' about them? Where shall the Tâo go to that it will not
be found? Where shall speech be found that it will be inappropriate? Tâo becomes obscured through the small comprehension (of the mind), and speech comes to be obscure through the vain-gloriousness (of the speaker). So it is that we have the contentions between the Literati 1 and the Mohists 2, the one side affirming what the other denies, and vice versâ. If we would decide on their several affirmations and denials, no plan is like bringing the (proper) light (of the mind) 3 to bear on them.
All subjects may be looked at from (two points of view),--from that and from this. If I look at a thing from another's point of view, I do not see it; only as I know it myself, do I know it. Hence it is said, 'That view comes from this; and this view is a consequence of that:'--which is the theory that that view and this--(the opposite views)-produce each the other 4. Although it be so, there is affirmed now life and now death; now death and now life; now the admissibility of a thing and now its inadmissibility; now its inadmissibility and now its admissibility. (The disputants) now affirm and now deny; now deny and now affirm. Therefore the sagely man does not pursue this method, but views things in the light of (his) Heaven 5 (-ly nature), and hence forms his judgment of what is right.
This view is the same as that, and that view is the same as this. But that view involves both a right and a wrong; and this view involves also a right and a wrong:--are there indeed, or are there not the two views, that and this? They have not found their point of correspondency which is called the pivot of the Tâo. As soon as one finds this pivot, he stands in the centre of the ring (of thought), where he can respond without end to the changing views;--without end to those affirming, and without end to those denying. Therefore I said, 'There is nothing like the proper light (of the mind).'
4. By means of a finger (of my own) to illustrate that the finger (of another) is not a finger is not so good a plan as to illustrate that it is not so by means of what is (acknowledged to be) not a finger; and by means of (what I call) a horse to illustrate that (what another calls) a horse is not so, is not so good a plan as to illustrate that it is not a horse, by means of what is (acknowledged to be) not a horse 1. (All things in) heaven and earth may be (dealt with as) a finger; (each of) their myriads may be (dealt with as) a horse. Does a thing seem so to me? (I say that) it is so. Does it seem not so to me? (I say that) it is not so. A path is formed by (constant)
treading on the ground. A thing is called by its name through the (constant) application of the name to it. How is it so? It is so because it is so. How is it not so? It is not so, because it is not so. Everything has its inherent character and its proper capability. There is nothing which has not these. Therefore, this being so, if we take a stalk of grain 1 and a (large) pillar, a loathsome (leper) and (a beauty like) Hsî Shih 2, things large and things insecure, things crafty and things strange;--they may in the light of the Tâo all be reduced to the same category (of opinion about them).
It was separation that led to completion; from completion ensued dissolution. But all things, without regard to their completion and dissolution, may again be comprehended in their unity;--it is only the far reaching in thought who know how to comprehend them in this unity. This being so, let us give up our devotion to our own views, and occupy ourselves with the ordinary views. These ordinary views are grounded on the use of things. (The study of that) use leads to the comprehensive judgment, and that judgment secures the success (of the inquiry). That success gained, we are near (to the object of our search), and there we stop. When we stop, and yet we do not know how it is so, we have what is called the Tâo.
When we toil our spirits and intelligence, obstinately
determined (to establish our own view), and do not know the agreement (which underlies it and the views of others), we have what is called 'In the morning three.' What is meant by that 'In the morning three?' A keeper of monkeys, in giving them out their acorns, (once) said, 'In the morning I will give you three (measures) and in the evening four.' This made them all angry, and he said, 'Very well. In the morning I will give you four and in the evening three.' His two proposals were substantially the same, but the result of the one was to make the creatures angry, and of the other to make them pleased:--an illustration of the point I am insisting on. Therefore the sagely man brings together a dispute in its affirmations and denials, and rests in the equal fashioning of Heaven 1. Both sides of the question are admissible.
5. Among the men of old their knowledge reached the extreme point. What was that extreme point? Some held that at first there was not anything. This is the extreme point, the utmost point to which nothing can be added 2. A second class held that there was something, but without any responsive recognition 3 of it (on the part of men).
A third class held that there was such recognition, but there had not begun to be any expression of different opinions about it.
It was through the definite expression of different opinions about it that there ensued injury to (the doctrine of) the Tâo. It was this injury to the (doctrine of the) Tâo which led to the formation of (partial) preferences. Was it indeed after such preferences were formed that the injury came? or did the injury precede the rise of such preferences? If the injury arose after their formation, Kâo's method of playing on the lute was natural. If the injury arose before their formation, there would have been no such playing on the lute as Kâo's 1.
Kâo Wän's playing on the lute, Shih Kwang's indicating time with his staff, and Hui-dze's (giving his views), while leaning against a dryandra tree (were all extraordinary). The knowledge of the three men (in their several arts) was nearly perfect, and therefore they practised them to the end of their lives. They loved them because they were different from those of others. They loved them and wished to make them known to others. But as they could not be made clear, though they tried to make them so, they ended with the obscure (discussions) about 'the hard' and 'the White.' And their sons 2, moreover, with all the threads of their fathers' compositions, yet to the end of their lives accomplished nothing. If they, proceeding in this way, could be said to have succeeded, then am I also successful;
if they cannot be pronounced successful, neither I nor any other can succeed.
Therefore the scintillations of light from the midst of confusion and perplexity are indeed valued by the sagely man; but not to use one's own views and to take his position on the ordinary views is what is called using the (proper) light.
6. But here now are some other sayings 1:--I do not know whether they are of the same character as those which I have already given, or of a different character. Whether they be of the same character or not when looked at along with them, they have a character of their own, which cannot be distinguished from the others. But though this be the case, let me try to explain myself.
There was a beginning. There was a beginning before that beginning 2. There was a beginning previous to that beginning before there was the beginning.
There was existence; there had been no existence. There was no existence before the beginning of that no existence 2. There was no existence previous to the no existence before there was the beginning of the no existence. If suddenly there was nonexistence, we do not know whether it was really anything existing, or really not existing. Now I have said what I have said, but I do not know whether what I have said be really anything to the point or not.
Under heaven there is nothing greater than the tip of an autumn down, and the Thâi mountain is small. There is no one more long-lived than a child which dies prematurely, and Phäng Zû did not live out his time. Heaven, Earth, and I were produced together, and all things and I are one. Since they are one, can there be speech about them? But since they are spoken of as one, must there not be room for speech? One and Speech are two; two and one are three. Going on from this (in our enumeration), the most skilful reckoner cannot reach (the end of the necessary numbers), and how much less can ordinary people do so! Therefore from non-existence we proceed to existence till we arrive at three; proceeding from existence to existence, to how many should we reach? Let us abjure such procedure, and simply rest here 1.
7. The Tâo at first met with no responsive recognition. Speech at first had no constant forms of expression. Because of this there came the demarcations (of different views). Let me describe those demarcations:--they are the Left and the Right 2; the Relations and their Obligations 3; Classifications 4
and their Distinctions; Emulations and Contentions. These are what are called 'the Eight Qualities.' Outside the limits of the world of men 1, the sage occupies his thoughts, but does not discuss about anything; inside those limits he occupies his thoughts, but does not pass any judgments. In the Khun Khiû 2, which embraces the history of the former kings, the sage indicates his judgments, but does not argue (in vindication of them). Thus it is that he separates his characters from one another without appearing to do so, and argues without the form of argument. How does he do so? The sage cherishes his views in his own breast, while men generally state theirs argumentatively, to show them to others. Hence we have the saying, 'Disputation is a proof of not seeing clearly.'
The Great Tâo 3 does not admit of being praised. The Great Argument does not require words. Great Benevolence is not (officiously) benevolent. Great Disinterestedness does not vaunt its humility. Great Courage is not seen in stubborn bravery.
The Tâo that is displayed is not the Tâo. Words that are argumentative do not reach the point. Benevolence that is constantly exercised does not accomplish its object. Disinterestedness that vaunts its purity is not genuine. Courage that is most stubborn
is ineffectual. These five seem to be round (and complete), but they tend to become square (and immovable) 1. Therefore the knowledge that stops at what it does not know is the greatest. Who knows the argument that needs no words, and the Way that is not to be trodden 2?
He who is able to know this has what is called 'The Heavenly Treasure-house 3.' He may pour into it without its being filled; he may pour from it without its being exhausted; and all the while he does not know whence (the supply) comes. This is what is called 'The Store of Light 3.'
Therefore of old Yâo asked Shun, saying, 'I wish to smite (the rulers of) Zung, Kwei, and Hsü-âo 4. Even when standing in my court, I cannot get them out of my mind. How is it so?' Shun replied, 'Those three rulers live (in their little states) as if they were among the mugwort and other brushwood;--how is it that you cannot get them out of your mind? Formerly, ten suns came out together, and all things were illuminated by them;--how much should (your) virtue exceed (all) suns!'
8. Nieh Khüeh 5 asked Wang Î 5, saying, 'Do you know, Sir, what all creatures agree in approving and
affirming?' 'How should I know it?' was the reply. 'Do you know what it is that you do not know?' asked the other again, and he got the same reply. He asked a third time,--'Then are all creatures thus without knowledge?' and Wang Î answered as before, (adding however), 'Notwithstanding, I will try and explain my meaning. How do you know that when I say "I know it," I really (am showing that) I do not know it, and that when I say "I do not know it," I really am showing that I do know it 1.' And let me ask you some questions:--'If a man sleep in a damp place, he will have a pain in his loins, and half his body will be as if it were dead; but will it be so with an eel? If he be living in a tree, he will be frightened and all in a tremble; but will it be so with a monkey? And does any one of the three know his right place? Men eat animals that have been fed on grain and grass; deer feed on the thickset grass; centipedes enjoy small snakes; owls and crows delight in mice; but does any one of the four know the right taste? The dog-headed monkey finds its mate in the female gibbon; the elk and the axis deer cohabit; and the eel enjoys itself with other fishes. Mâo Zhiang 2 and Lî Kî 2 were accounted by men to be most beautiful, but when fishes saw them, they dived deep in the water from them; when birds, they flew from them aloft; and
when deer saw them, they separated and fled away 1. But did any of these four know which in the world is the right female attraction? As I look at the matter, the first principles of benevolence and righteousness and the paths of approval and disapproval are inextricably mixed and confused together:--how is it possible that I should know how to discriminate among them?'
Nieh Khüeh said (further), 'Since you, Sir, do not know what is advantageous and what is hurtful, is the Perfect man also in the same way without the knowledge of them?' Wang i replied, 'The Perfect man is spirit-like. Great lakes might be boiling about him, and he would not feel their heat; the Ho and the Han might be frozen up, and he would not feel the cold; the hurrying thunderbolts might split the mountains, and the wind shake the ocean, without being able to make him afraid. Being such, he mounts on the clouds of the air, rides on the sun and moon, and rambles at ease beyond the four seas. Neither death nor life makes any change in him, and how much less should the considerations of advantage and injury do so 2!'
9. Khü Zhiâo-dze 3 asked Khang-wû Dze 3, saying,
'I heard the Master (speaking of such language as the following):--"The sagely man does not occupy himself with worldly affairs. He does not put himself in the way of what is profitable, nor try to avoid what is hurtful; he has no pleasure in seeking (for anything from any one); he does not care to be found in (any established) Way; he speaks without speaking; he does not speak when he speaks; thus finding his enjoyment outside the dust and dirt (of the world)." The Master considered all this to be a shoreless flow of mere words, and I consider it to describe the course of the Mysterious Way.--What do you, Sir, think of it?' Khang-wû dze replied, 'The hearing of such words would have perplexed even Hwang-Tî, and how should Khiû be competent to understand them? And you, moreover, are too hasty in forming your estimate (of their meaning). You see the egg, and (immediately) look out for the cock (that is to be hatched from it); you see the bow, and (immediately) look out for the dove (that is to be brought down by it) being roasted. I will try to explain the thing to you in a rough way; do you in the same way listen to me.
'How could any one stand by the side of the sun and moon, and hold under his arm all space and all time? (Such language only means that the sagely man) keeps his mouth shut, and puts aside questions that are uncertain and dark; making his inferior capacities unite with him in honouring (the One Lord). Men in general bustle about and toil; the
sagely man seems stupid and to know nothing 1. He blends ten thousand years together in the one (conception of time); the myriad things all pursue their spontaneous course, and they are all before him as doing so.
'How do I know that the love of life is not a delusion? and that the dislike of death is not like a young person's losing his way, and not knowing that he is (really) going home? Lî Kî 2 was a daughter of the border Warden of Ai. When (the ruler of) the state of Zin first got possession of her, she wept till the tears wetted all the front of her dress. But when she came to the place of the king 3, shared with him his luxurious couch, and ate his grain-and-grass-fed meat, then she regretted that she had wept. How do I know that the dead do not repent of their former craving for life?
'Those who dream of (the pleasures of) drinking may in the morning wail and weep; those who dream of wailing and weeping may in the morning be going out to hunt. When they were dreaming they did not know it was a dream; in their dream they may even have tried to interpret it 4; but when they awoke they knew that it was a dream. And
there is the great awaking, after which we shall know that this life was a great dream 1. All the while, the stupid think they are awake, and with nice discrimination insist on their knowledge; now playing the part of rulers, and now of grooms. Bigoted was that Khiû! He and you are both dreaming. I who say that you are dreaming am dreaming myself. These words seem very strange; but if after ten thousand ages we once meet with a great sage who knows how to explain them, it will be as if we met him (unexpectedly) some morning or evening.
10. 'Since you made me enter into this discussion with you, if you have got the better of me and not I of you, are you indeed right, and I indeed wrong? If I have got the better of you and not you of me, am I indeed right and you indeed wrong? Is the one of us right and the other wrong? are we both right or both wrong? Since we cannot come to a mutual and common understanding, men will certainly continue in darkness on the subject.
'Whom shall I employ to adjudicate in the matter? If I employ one who agrees with you, how can he, agreeing with you, do so correctly? And the same may be said, if I employ one who agrees with me. It will be the same if I employ one who differs from us both or one who agrees with us both. In this way I and you and those others would all not be able to come to a mutual understanding; and shall we then wait for that (great sage)? (We need not do so.) To wait on others to learn how conflicting opinions are changed is simply like not so
waiting at all. The harmonising of them is to be found in the invisible operation of Heaven, and by following this on into the unlimited past. It is by this method that we can complete our years (without our minds being disturbed) 1.
'What is meant by harmonising (conflicting opinions) in the invisible operation of Heaven? There is the affirmation and the denial of it; and there is the assertion of an opinion and the rejection of it. If the affirmation be according to the reality of the fact, it is certainly different from the denial of it:--there can be no dispute about that. If the assertion of an opinion be correct, it is certainly different from its rejection:--neither can there be any dispute about that. Let us forget the lapse of time; let us forget the conflict of opinions. Let us make our appeal to the Infinite, and take up our position there 2.'
11. The Penumbra asked the Shadow 3, saying, 'Formerly you were walking on, and now you have stopped; formerly you were sitting, and now you have risen up:--how is it that you are so without stability?' The Shadow replied, 'I wait for the movements of something else to do what I do, and that something else on which I wait waits further
on another to do as it does 1. My waiting,--is it for the scales of a snake, or the wings of a cicada 2? How should I know why I do one thing, or do not do another 3?
'Formerly, I, Kwang Kâu, dreamt that I was a butterfly, a butterfly flying about, feeling that it was enjoying itself I did not know that it was Kâu. Suddenly I awoke, and was myself again, the veritable Kâu. I did not know whether it had formerly been Kâu dreaming that he was a butterfly, or it was now a butterfly dreaming that it was Kâu. But between Kâu and a butterfly there must be a difference 4. This is a case of what is called the Transformation of Things 4.'
176:1 See pp. 128-130.
176:2 Nan-kwo, 'the southern suburb,' had probably been the quarter where Dze-khî had resided, and is used as his surname. He is introduced several times by Kwang-dze in his writings:--Books IV, 7; XXVII, 4, and perhaps elsewhere.
176:3 We have the surname of this disciple, Yen ( ); his name, Yen ( ); his honorary or posthumous epithet (Khäng); and his ordinary appellation, Dze-yû. The use of the epithet shows that he and his master had lived before our author.
176:4 'He had lost himself;' that is, he had become unconscious of all around him, and even of himself, as if he were about to enter p. 177 into the state of Ian Immortal,' a mild form of the Buddhistic samâdhi. But his attitude and appearance were intended by Kwang-dze to indicate what should be the mental condition in reference to the inquiry pursued in the Book;--a condition, it appears to me, of agnosticism. See the account of Lâo-dze in a similar trance in Book XXI, par. 4.
177:1 The Chinese term here (lâi) denotes a reed or pipe, with three holes, by a combination of which there was formed the rudimentary or reed organ. Our author uses it for the sounds or notes heard in nature, various as the various opinions of men in their discussions about things.
178:1 The sounds of Earth have been described fully and graphically. Of the sounds of Man very little is said, but they form the subject of the next paragraph. Nothing is said in answer to the disciple's inquiry about the notes of Heaven. It is intimated, however, that there is no necessity to introduce any foreign Influence or Power like Heaven in connexion. with the notes of Earth. The term Heaven, indeed, is about to pass with our author into a mere synonym of Tâo, the natural 'course' of the phenomena of men and things.
178:2 Words are the 'sounds' of Man; and knowledge is the 'wind' by which they are excited.
179:1 A true Governor' would be a good enough translation for 'the true God.' But Kwang-dze did not admit any supernatural Power or Being as working in man. His true Governor was the Tâo; and this will be increasingly evident as we proceed with the study of his Books.
180:1 The name 'Ruler' is different from 'Governor' above; but they both indicate the same concept in the author's mind.
180:2 The proper reply to this would be that the mind is not dissolved with the body; and Kwang-dze's real opinion, as we shall find, was that life and death were but phases in the phenomenal development. But the course of his argument suggests to us the question here, 'Is life worth living?'
181:1 This 'teacher' is 'the Tâo.'
181:2 Expressing the absurdity of the case. This is one of the sayings of Hui-dze;--see Book XXXIII, par. 7.
181:3 The successor and counsellor of Shun, who coped with and remedied the flood of Yâo.
182:1 The followers of Confucius.
182:2 The disciples of Mih-dze, or Mih Tî, the heresiarch, whom Mencius attacked so fiercely;--see Mencius, V, 1, 5, e t al. His era must be assigned between Confucius and Mencius.
182:3 That is, the perfect mind, the principle of the Tâo.
182:4 As taught by Hui-dze;--see XXXIII, 7; but it is doubtful if the quotation from Hui's teaching be complete.
182:5 Equivalent to the Tâo. See on the use in Lâo-dze and Kwang-dze of the term 'Heaven,' in the Introduction, pp. 16-18.
183:1 The language of our author here is understood to have reference to the views of Kung-sun Lung, a contemporary of Hui-dze, and a sophist like him. One of his treatises or arguments had the title of 'The White Horse,' and another that of 'Pointing to Things.' If these had been preserved, we might have seen more clearly the appropriateness of the text here. But the illustration of the monkeys and their actions shows us the scope of the whole paragraph to be that controversialists, whose views are substantially the same, may yet differ, and that with heat, in words.
184:1 The character in the text means both 'a stalk of grain' and a horizontal beam.' Each meaning has its advocates here.
184:2 A famous beauty, a courtezan presented by the king of Yüeh to his enemy, the king of Wû, and who hastened on his progress to ruin and death, she herself perishing at the same time.
185:1 Literally, 'the Heaven-Mould or Moulder,'--another name for the Tâo, by which all things are fashioned.
185:2 See the same passage in Book XXIII, par. 10.
185:3 The ordinary reading here is fäng ( ) 'a boundary' or 'distinctive limit.' Lin Hsî-hung adopts the reading , 'a response,' and I have followed him.
186:1 Kâo Wän and Shih Kwang were both musicians of the state of Zin. Shih, which appears as Kwang's surname, was his denomination as 'music-master.' It is difficult to understand the reason why Kwang-dze introduces these men and their ways, or how it helps his argument.
186:2 Perhaps we should read here 'son,' with special reference to the son of Hui-Sze.
187:1 Referring, I think, to those below commencing 'There was a beginning.'
187:2 That is, looking at things from the standpoint of an original non-existence, and discarding all considerations of space and time.
188:1 On this concluding clause, Ziâo Hung says:--'Avoiding such procedure, there will be no affirmations and denials (no contraries). The phrase occurs in the Book several times, and interpreters have missed its meaning from not observing that serve merely as a final particle, and often have the added to them, without affecting its meaning.' See also Wang Yin on the usages of in the , ch. 1208, art. 6.
188:2 That is, direct opposites.
188:3 Literally 'righteousnesses;' the proper way of dealing with the relations.
188:4 Literally, 'separations.'
189:1 Literally, 'the six conjunctions,' meaning the four cardinal points of space, with the zenith and nadir; sometimes a name for the universe of space. Here we must restrict the meaning as I have done.
189:2 'The Spring and Autumn;'--Confucius's Annals of Lû, here complimented by Kwang-dze. See in Mencius, IV, ii, 21.
189:3 Compare the Tâo Teh King, ch. 25, et al.
190:1 Compare the use of in the Shû King, I, iii, 11.
190:2 The classic of Lâo, in chaps. 1, 2.
190:3 Names for the Tâo.
190:4 Three small states. Is Yao's wish to smite an instance of the 'quality' of 'emulation' or jealousy?
190:5 Both Tâoistic worthies of the time of Yâo, supposed to have been two of the Perfect Ones whom Yâo visited on the distant hill of Kû-shih (I, par. 6). According to Hwang Mî, Wang Î was the teacher of Nieh Khüeh, and he again of Hsü Yû.
191:1 Compare par. 1 of Book XXII.
191:2 Two famous beauties;--the former, a contemporary of Hsî Shih (par. 4, note 2), and like her also, of the state of Yüeh; the latter, the daughter of a barbarian chief among the Western Jung. She was captured by duke Hsien of Zin, in B. C. 672. He subsequently made her his wife,--to the great injury of his family and state.
192:1 Not thinking them beautiful, as men did, but frightened and repelled by them.
192:2 Compare Book 1, pars. 3 and 5.
192:3 We know nothing of the former of these men, but what is mentioned here; the other appears also in Book XXV, 6, q. v. If 'the master' that immediately follows be Confucius they must have been contemporary with him. The Khiû in Khang-wû's reply would seem to make it certain 'the master' was Confucius, but the oldest critics, and some modern ones as well, think that Khang-wû's name was also Khiû. But this view is attended with more p. 193 difficulties than the other. By the clause interjected in the translation after the first 'Master,' I have avoided the incongruity of ascribing the long description of Tâoism to Confucius.
194:1 Compare Lâo-dze's account of himself in his Work, ch. 20.
194:2 See note 2 on page 191. The lady is there said to have been the daughter of a barbarian chief; here she appears as the child of the border Warden of Aî. But her maiden surname of Kî ( ) shows her father must have been a scion of the royal family of Kâu. Had he forsaken his wardenship, and joined one of the Tî tribes, which had adopted him as its chief?
194:3 Zin was only a marquisate. How does Kwang-dze speak of its ruler as 'a king?'
194:4 This could not be; a man does not come to himself in his dream, and in that state try to interpret it.
195:1 Compare XVIII, par. 4.
196:1 See this passage again in Book XXVII, par. i, where the phrase which I have called here 'the invisible operation of Heaven,' is said to be the same as 'the Heavenly Mould or Moulder,' that is, the Heavenly Fashioner, one of the Tâoistic names for the Tâo.
196:2 That is, all things being traced up to the unity of the Tâo, we have found the pivot to which all conflicting opinions, all affirmations, all denials, all positions and negatives converge, and bring to bear on them the proper light of the mind. Compare paragraph 3.
196:3 A story to the same effect as this here, with some textual variations, occurs in Book XXVII, immediately after par. 1 referred to above.
197:1 The mind cannot rest in second causes, and the first cause, if there be one, is inscrutable.
197:2 Even these must wait for the will of the creature; but the case of the shadow is still more remarkable.
197:3 I have put this interrogatively, as being more graphic, and because of the particle , which is generally, though not necessarily, interrogative.
197:4 Hsüan Ying, in his remarks on these two sentences, brings out the force of the story very successfully:--'Looking at them in their ordinary appearance, there was necessarily a difference between them, but in the delusion of the dream each of them appeared the other, and they could not distinguish themselves! Kâu could be a butterfly, and the butterfly could be Kâu;--we may see that in the world all traces of that and this may pass away, as they come under the influence of transformations.' For the phrase, 'the transformation of things,' see in Book X1, par. 5, et al. But the Tâoism here can hardly be distinguished from the Buddhism that holds that all human experience is merely so much mâya or illusion.