Jaina Sutras, Part II (SBE45), tr. by Hermann Jacobi, , at sacred-texts.com
p. xii p. xiii
TEN years have elapsed since the first part of my translation of Gaina Sûtras appeared. During that decennium many and very important additions to our knowledge of Gainism and its history have been made by a small number of excellent scholars. The text of the canonical books, together with good commentaries in Sanskrit and Guzeratî, has been made accessible in fair editions published by native scholars in India. Critical editions of two of them have been published by Professors Leumann 1 and Hoernle 2; and the latter scholar has added a careful translation and ample illustrations to his edition of the text. A general survey of the whole Gaina literature has been given by Professor Weber in his catalogue of the Berlin Manuscripts 3 and in his learned treatise 4 on the sacred literature of the Gainas. The development of Gaina learning and science has been studied by Professor Leumann, and some Gaina legends and their relations to those of the Brahmans and Buddhists have been investigated by the same scholar 5. An important document for our knowledge of the old history of the Svêtâmbara sect has been edited
by myself 1, and the history of some of their Gakkhas has been made known from their lists of teachers by Hoernle and Klatt. The last-named scholar, whom we have all but lost by this time, has prepared a biographical dictionary of all Gaina writers and historical persons, and he has issued specimens of this great Onomasticon, while Hofrat Bühler has written a detailed biography of the famous encyclopaedist Hêmakandra 2. The same scholar has deciphered the ancient inscriptions, and discussed the sculptures excavated by Dr. Führer at Mathurâ 3, and the important inscriptions at Sravana Belgola have been edited by Mr. Lewis Rice 4; M. A. Barth has reviewed our knowledge of Gainism 5, and likewise Bühler in a short paper 6. Lastly Bhandarkar has given a most valuable sketch of the whole of Gainism 7. All these additions to our knowledge of Gainism (and I have but mentioned the most remarkable ones) have shed so much clear light on the whole subject that little room is left now for mere guesswork, and the true historical and philological method can be applied to all its parts. Still some of the principal problems require elucidation, while the proffered solution of others is not accepted by all scholars. I, therefore, gladly avail myself of this opportunity to discuss some of the disputed points, for the settling of which the works translated in this volume offer valuable materials.
It is now admitted by all that Nâtaputta (Gñâtriputra), who is commonly called Mahâvîra or Vardhamâna, was a contemporary of Buddha; and that the Niganthas 8
[paragraph continues] (Nirgranthas), now better known under the name of Gainas or Ârhatas, already existed as an important sect at the time when the Buddhist church was being founded. But it is still open to doubt whether the religion of the early Nirgranthas was essentially the same as that taught in the canonical and other books of the present Gainas, or underwent a great change up to the time of the composition of the Siddhânta. In order to come nearer the solution of this question, it may be desirable to collect from the published Buddhist works, as the oldest witnesses we can summon, all available information about the Niganthas, their doctrines and religious practices.
In the Aṅguttara Nikâya, III, 74, a learned prince of the Likkhavis of Vaisâlî, Abhaya 1, gives the following account of some Nigantha doctrines: 'The Nigantha Nâtaputta, sir, who knows and sees all things, who claims perfect knowledge and faith (in the following terms): "walking and standing, sleeping or waking, I am always possessed of perfect knowledge and faith;" teaches the annihilation by austerities of the old Karman, and the prevention by inactivity of new Karman. When Karman ceases, misery ceases; when misery ceases, perception ceases; when perception ceases, every misery will come to an end. In this way a man is saved by pure annihilation of sin (niggarâ) which is really effective.'
The Gaina counterpart to these tenets can be collected from the Uttarâdhyayana XXIX. By austerities he cuts off Karman,' § 27. 'By renouncing activity he obtains inactivity; by ceasing to act he acquires no new Karman, and destroys the Karman he had acquired before,' § 37. The last stages in this process are fully described in §§ 71,
[paragraph continues] 72. And again, in XXXII, v. 7, we read: 'Karman is the root of birth and death, and birth and death they call misery.' The nearly identical verses 34, 47, 60, 73, 86, 99 may be thus condensed: 'But a man who is indifferent to the object of the senses, and to the feelings of the mind [this comes nearest to the Buddhist vêdanâ, perception], is free from sorrows; though still in the Samsâra, he is not afflicted by that long succession of pains. just as the leaf of the Lotus (is not moistened) by water.'
The above assertion that Nâtaputta claimed the possession of perfect knowledge and faith, requires no further proof; for it is one of the fundamental dogmas of the Gainas.
Another piece of information about Nigantha doctrines may be gathered from the Mahâvagga VI, 31 (S. B. E., vol. xvii, p. 108 ff.) There a story is told of Sîha 1, the general of the Likkhavis, who was a lay disciple of Nâtaputta. He wanted to pay the Buddha a visit, but Nâtaputta tried to dissuade him from it, because the Niganthas held the Kriyâvâda, while the Buddha taught the Akriyâvâda. Sîha, however, setting his master's prohibition at nought, went to the Buddha on his own account, and was, of course, converted by him. Now the statement that the Niganthas embraced the Kriyâvâda is borne out by our texts; for in the Sûtrakritâṅga I, 12, 21, below, p. 319, it is said that a perfect ascetic 'is entitled to expound the Kriyâvâda;' and this doctrine is thus expressed in the Âkârâṅga Sûtra I, 1, 1, 4 (part i, p. 2): 'He believes in soul, believes in the world, believes in reward, believes in action (believed to be our own doing in such judgments as these): "I did it;" "I shall cause another to do it;" "I shall allow another to do it.'
Another lay disciple of Mahâvîra, converted by the Buddha, was Upâli. As narrated in the Magghima Nikâya 56, he ventured upon a dispute with him whether the sins of the mind are heaviest, as the Buddha teaches, or the
sins of the body, as the Nigantha Nâtaputta contends. In the beginning of the discourse Upâli states that his master uses the term danda, punishment, for what is commonly called kamma, deed, act. This is true, though not quite to the letter; for the word kamma occurs also in the Gaina Sûtras in that sense. The term danda, however, is at least as frequently used. Thus, in the Sûtrakritâṅga II, 2, p. 357 ff., the thirteen kinds of 'committing sins' are treated of, and in the first five cases the word which I have translated committing sins' is in the original dandasamâdâne, and in the remaining cases kiriyâthane, i.e. kriyâsthâna.
The Nigantha Upâli goes on to explain that there are three dandas, the danda of body, that of speech, and that of mind. This agrees with the Gaina doctrine expressed in nearly the same words in the Sthânâṅga Sûtra, 3rd uddêsaka (see Indian Antiquary, IX, p. 159).
The second statement of Upâli, that the Niganthas consider sins of the body more important than sins of the mind, is in perfect harmony with Gaina views. For in the Sûtrakritâṅga II, 4, p. 398 ff., the question is discussed whether sins may be committed unconsciously, and it is boldly answered in the affirmative (compare note 6, p. 399); and in the Sixth Lecture of the same book (p. 414) the Buddhists are severely ridiculed for maintaining that it depends on the intention of the man whether a deed of his be a sin or not.
In the Aṅguttara Nikâya III, 70, 3, some practices of Nigantha laymen are discussed. I translate the passage thus: 'O Visâkhâ, there is a class of Samanas who are called Niganthas. They exhort a Sâvaka thus: "Well, sir, you must desist from doing injury to beings in the East beyond a yôgana from here, or to those in the West, North, South, always beyond a yôgana from here." In this way they enjoin tenderness by making him spare some living beings; in this way they enjoin cruelty by making him not spare other living beings.' It is not difficult to recognise under these words the Digvirati vow of the Gainas, which
consists in laying down the limits beyond which one shall not travel nor do business in the different directions. A man who keeps this vow cannot, of course, do any harm to beings beyond the limits within which he is obliged to keep. This is so distorted by the hostile sect as to lay the rule under discussion open to blame. We cannot expect one sect to give a fair and honest exposition of the tenets of their opponents; it is but natural that they should put them in such a form as to make the objections to be raised against them all the better applicable. The Gainas were not a whit better in this respect than the Bauddhas, and they have retorted upon them in the same way; witness their misrepresentation of the Buddhist idea that a deed becomes a sin only through the sinful intention of the doer, in a passage in the present volume, p. 414, v. 26 ff., where the sound principle of the Buddhists is ridiculed by applying it to a fictitious and almost absurd case.
The passage in the Aṅguttara Nikâya, which we have just discussed, goes on as follows: 'On the Upôsatha day they exhort a Sâvaka thus: "Well, sir, take off all your clothes and declare: I belong to nobody, and nobody belongs to me." Now his parents know him to be their son, and he knows them to be his parents. His son or wife know him to be their father or husband, and he knows them to be his son or wife. His slaves and servants know him to be their master, and he knows them to be his slaves and servants. Therefore (the Niganthas) make him use lying speech at the time when he makes the above declarations. On this account I charge him with lying speech. After the lapse of that night he enjoys pleasures (by means of things) that were not freely given. On this account I charge him with taking of what is not freely given.'
According to this statement, the duties of a Nigantha layman became, during the Upôsatha days, equal to those of a monk; it was on common days only that the difference between layman and monk was realised. This description, however, does not quite agree with the Pôsaha rules of the Gainas. Bhandarkar gives the following definition of Pôsaha
according to the Tattvârthasâradîpikâ, which agrees with what we know about it from other sources: Pôsaha, i.e. to observe a fast or eat once only or one dish only on the two holy days (the eighth and the fourteenth of each fortnight), after having given up bathing, unguents, ornaments, company of women, odours, incense, lights, &c., and assumed renunciation as an ornament.' Though the Pôsaha observances of the present Gainas are apparently more severe than those of the Buddhists, still they fall short of the above description of the Nigantha rules; for a Gaina layman does not, to my knowledge, take off his clothes during the Pôsaha days, though he discards all ornaments and every kind of luxury; nor must he pronounce any formula of renunciation similar to that which the monks utter on entering the order. Therefore, unless the Buddhist account contains some mistake or a gross misstatement, it would appear that the Gainas have abated somewhat in their rigidity with regard to the duties of laymen.
Buddhaghôsa, in his commentary on the Brahmagâla Sutta, Dîgha Nikâya I, 2, 38 1, mentions the Niganthas as holding the opinion, discussed in the text, that the soul has no colour, in contradistinction to the Âgîvikas, who divide mankind into six classes according to the colour of the Âtman; both Niganthas and Âgîvikas, however, agree in maintaining that the soul continues to exist after death and is free from ailments (arôgô). Whatever may be the exact meaning of the last expression, it is clear that the above description squares with the opinions of the Gainas about the nature of the soul, as described below, p. 172 f.
In another passage (l.c. p. 168) Buddhaghôsa says that Nigantha Nâtaputta considers cold water to be possessed of life (so kira sîtôdakê sattasaññî hôti), for which reason he does not use it. This doctrine of the Gainas is so generally known that I need not bring forward any quotation from the Sûtras in support of its genuineness.
This is nearly all the information on the doctrines of the
ancient Niganthas which I have been able to gather from the Pâli texts. Though it is less than we desire, its value is not to be underrated. For with one exception all the doctrines and usages of the ancient Niganthas mentioned agree with those of the present Gainas, and they comprise some of the fundamental ideas of Gainism. It is therefore not probable that the doctrines of the Gainas have undergone a great change in the interval between the quoted Buddhist records and the composition of the Gaina canon.
I have purposely deferred the discussion of the classical passage on the doctrines of Nigantha Nâtaputta, because it leads us to a new line of inquiry. The passage in question occurs in the Sâmaññaphala Sutta of the Dîgha Nikâya 1. I translate it in accordance with Buddhaghôsa's comment in the Sumaṅgala Vilâsinî. 'Here, great king, a Nigantha is protected by restraint in four directions (kâtuyâmasamvarasamvutô). How, great king, is a Nigantha protected by restraint in four directions? Here, great king, a Nigantha abstains from all (cold) water, he abstains from all bad deeds, by abstinence from all bad deeds he is free from sins, he realises abstinence from all bad deeds. In this way, great king, a Nigantha is protected by restraint in four directions. And, great king, because he is thus protected, the Nigantha Nâtaputta's soul is exalted, is restrained, is well settled 2.'--This is, certainly, not an accurate nor an exhaustive description of the Gaina creed, though it contains nothing alien from it, and successfully imitates the language of the Gaina Sûtras. As I have already explained elsewhere 3, I think the term kâtuyâmasamvarasamvutô has been misunderstood not only by the commentator, but also by the author of the text. For
the Pâli kâtuyâma is equivalent to the Prâkrit kâtuggâma, a well-known Gaina term which denotes the four vows of Pârsva in contradistinction to the five vows (pañka mahavvaya) of Mahâvîra. Here, then, the Buddhists, I suppose, have made a mistake in ascribing to Nâtaputta Mahâvîra a doctrine which properly belonged to his predecessor Pârsva. This is a significant mistake; for the Buddhists could not have used the above term as descriptive of the Nigantha creed unless they had heard it from followers of Pârsva, and they would not have used it if the reforms of Mahâvîra had already been generally adopted by the Niganthas at the time of the Buddha. I, therefore, look on this blunder of the Buddhists as a proof for the correctness of the Gaina tradition, that followers of Pârsva actually existed at the time of Mahâvîra.
Before following up this line of inquiry, I have to call attention to another significant blunder of the Buddhists: they call Nâtaputta an Aggivêsana, i.e. Agnivaisyâyana; according to the Gainas, however, he was a Kâsyapa, and we may credit them in such particulars about their own Tîrthakara. But Sudharman, his chief disciple, who in the Sûtras is made the expounder of his creed, was an Agnivaisyâyana, and as he played a prominent part in the propagation of the Gaina religion, the disciple may often have been confounded by outsiders with the master, so that the Gôtra of the former was erroneously assigned to the latter. Thus by a double blunder the Buddhists attest the existence of Mahâvîra's predecessor Pârsva and of his chief disciple Sudharman.
That Pârsva was a historical person, is now admitted by all as very probable; indeed, his followers, especially Kêsi 1, who seems to have been the leader of the sect at the time of Mahâvîra, are frequently mentioned in Gaina Sûtras in such a matter-of-fact way, as to give us no reason for doubting the authenticity of those records. The legend in
the Uttarâdhyayana, Lecture XXIII, how the union of the old and the new church was effected, is of much interest in this respect. Kêsi and Gautama, the representatives and leaders of the two branches of the Gaina church, both at the head of their pupils, meet in a park near Srâvasti; the differences in their creed concerning the number of great vows, and the use or disuse of clothes are explained away without further discussion, and full harmony with regard to the fundamental ethical ideas is satisfactorily established by the readiness with which allegorical expressions of the one speaker are understood and explained by the other. There seems to have been some estrangement, but no hostility between the two branches of the church; and though the members of the older branch invariably are made to adopt the Law of Mahâvîra, 'which enjoins five vows,' it may be imagined that they continued in some of their old practices, especially with regard to the use of clothes, which Mahâvîra had abandoned. On this assumption we can account for the division of the church in Svêtâmbaras and Digambaras, about the origin of which both sects have contradictory legends 1. There was apparently no sudden rupture; but an original diversity (such as e.g. subsists now between the several Gakkhas of the Svêtâmbaras) ripened into division, and in the end brought about the great schism.
The records in the Buddhist Canon are not repugnant to our views about the existence of the Niganthas before Nâtaputta; for the Niganthas must have been an important sect at the time when Buddhism took its rise. This may be inferred from the fact that they are so frequently mentioned in the Pitakas as opponents or converts of Buddha and his disciples; and as it is nowhere said or even merely implied that the Niganthas were a newly-founded sect, we may conclude that they had already existed a considerable time before the advent of the Buddha. This conclusion is supported by another fact. Makkhali Gôsâla, a contemporary
of Buddha and Mahâvîra, divided mankind into six classes 1. Of these, according to Buddhaghôsa 2, the third class contains the Niganthas. Gôsâla probably would not have ranked them as a separate, i.e. fundamental subdivision of mankind, if they had only recently come into existence. He must have looked upon them as a very important, and at the same time, an old sect, in the same way in which, in my opinion, the early Buddhists looked upon them. As a last argument in favour of my theory I may mention that in the Magghima Nikâya 35, a disputation between the Buddha and Sakkaka, the son of a Nigantha, is narrated. Sakkaka is not a Nigantha himself, as he boasts of having vanquished Nâtaputta in disputation 3, and, moreover, the tenets he defends are not those of the Gainas. Now when a famous controversialist, whose father was a Nigantha, was a contemporary of the Buddha, the Niganthas can scarcely have been a sect founded during Buddha's life.
Let us now confront the records of the Gainas about the philosophical doctrines of heretics, which they had to combat, with such as the Buddhists describe. In the Sûtrakritâṅga II, I, 15 (p. 339 f.) and 21 f. (p. 343) two materialistic theories which have much in common are spoken of. The first passage treats of the opinion of those who contend that the body and the soul are one and the same thing; the second passage is concerned with the doctrine that the five elements are eternal and constitute everything. The adherents of either philosophy maintain that it is no sin to kill living beings. Similar opinions are, in the Sâmaññaphala Sutta, ascribed to Pûrana Kassapa and Agita Kêsakambalî. The former denies that there is such a thing as sin or merit. Agita Kêsakambalî holds that nothing real
corresponds to the current transcendental ideas. He moreover maintains: Man (purisô) consists of the four elements; when he dies, earth returns to earth, water to water, fire to fire, wind to wind, and the organs of sense merge into air (or space) 1. Four bearers with the hearse carry the corpse to the place of cremation (or, while it is burned) they make lamentations; the dove-coloured bones remain, the offerings are reduced to ashes.' The last passage recurs with few alterations in the Sûtrakritâṅga, p. 340: 'Other men carry the corpse away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire, only dove-coloured bones remain, and the four bearers return with the hearse to their village 2.'
In connection with the second materialistic system (p. 343, § 22, and p. 237 f., vv. 15, 16) a variety of it is mentioned, which adds the permanent Âtman or soul as a sixth to the five permanent elements. This seems to have been a primitive or a popular form of the philosophy which we now know under the name of Vaisêshika. To this school of philosophy we must perhaps assign Pakudha Kakkâyana of Buddhist record. He maintained 3 that there are seven eternal, unchangeable, mutually independent things: the four elements, pleasure, pain, and the soul. As they have no influence upon one another, it is impossible to do any real harm to anybody. I confess that to maintain the eternal existence of pleasure and pain (sukha and dukkha) and to deny their influence on the soul, seems to me absurd; but the Buddhists have perhaps misstated the original tenets. At any rate, the views of Pakudha Kakkâyana
come under the denomination of Akriyâvâda; and in this they differ from the Vaisêshika proper, which is a Kriyâvâda system. As these two terms are frequently used both by Buddhists and Gainas, it will not be amiss to define them more accurately. Kriyâvâda is the doctrine which teaches that the soul acts or is affected by acts. Under this head comes Gainism, and of Brahmanical philosophies Vaisêshika and Nyâya (which, however, are not expressly quoted in the canonical books of either Buddhists or Gainas), and apparently a great many systems of which the names have not been preserved, but the existence of which is implied in our texts. Akriyâvâda is the doctrine which teaches either that a soul does not exist, or that it does not act or is not affected by acts. Under this subdivision fall the different schools of materialists; of Brahmanical philosophies the Vêdânta, Sâṅkhya, and Yoga; and the Buddhists. Of the latter the doctrines of the Kshanikavâdins and the Sûnyavâdins are alluded to in Sûtrakritâṅga I, 14, verses 4 and 7. It may be mentioned here that the Vêdântists or their opinions are frequently mentioned in the Siddhânta; in the Sûtrakritâṅga the Vêdânta is the third heresy described in the First Lecture of the Second Book, p. 344; it is also adverted to in the Sixth Lecture, p. 417. But as no professor of it was among the six heretical teachers (titthiya) of the Buddhists, we may pass them over here 1.
The fourth heresy discussed in the First Lecture of the Second Book of the Sûtrakritâṅga 2 is Fatalism. In the Sâmaññaphala Sutta this system is expounded by Makkhali Gôsâla in the following words 3: 'Great king, there is no cause, nor any previously existing principle productive of the pollution of sentient beings; their defilement is uncaused and unproduced by anything previously existing. There is no cause nor any previously existing principle
productive of the purity of sentient beings: their purity is uncaused and unproduced by anything previously existing. For their production there is nothing that results from the conduct of the individuals, nothing from the actions of others, nothing from human effort: they result neither from power nor effort, neither from manly fortitude nor manly energy. Every sentient being, every insect, every living thing, whether animal or vegetable 1, is destitute of intrinsic force, power, or energy, but, being held by the necessity of its nature, experiences happiness or misery in the six forms of existence, &c.' The explanation of these doctrines in the Sûtrakritâṅga (l.c.), though less wordy, comes to the same; it does not, however, expressly ascribe them to Gôsâla, the son of Makkhali.
The Gainas enumerate four principal schools of philosophy 2: Kriyâvâda, Akriyâvâda, Agñânavâda, and Vainayikavâda. The views of the Agñânikas, or Agnostics, are not clearly stated in the texts, and the explanation of the commentators of all these philosophies which I have given in note 2, p. 83, is vague and misleading. But from Buddhist writings we may form a pretty correct idea of what Agnosticism was like. It is, according to the Sâmaññaphala Sutta, the doctrine of Sañgaya Bêlatthiputta, and is there stated in the following way 3: 'If you inquire of me whether there be a future state of being, I answer: If I experience a future state of existence, I will then explain the nature of that state. If they inquire, Is it after this manner? that is
not my concern. Is it after that fashion? that is not my concern. Is it different from these? that is not my concern. Is it not? that is not my concern. No, is it not? It is no concern of mine.' In the same way he e.g. refuses a definite answer to the questions whether the Tathâgata is after death, or is not; is and is not at the same time, is not nor is not at the same time. It is evident that the Agnostics examined all modes of expression of the existence or nonexistence of a thing, and if it were anything transcendental or beyond human experience, they negatived all those modes of expression.
The records of the Buddhists and Gainas about the philosophical ideas current at the time of the Buddha and Mahâvîra, meagre though they be, are of the greatest importance to the historian of that epoch. For they show us the ground on which, and the materials with which, a religious reformer had to build his system. The similarity between some of those 'heretical' doctrines on the one side, and Gaina or Buddhist ideas on the other, is very suggestive, and favours the assumption that the Buddha, as well as Mahâvîra, owed some of his conceptions to these very heretics, and formulated others under the influence of the controversies which were continually going on with them. Thus, I think, that in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sañgaya, Mahâvîra has established the Syâdvâda. For as the Agñânavâda declares that of a thing beyond our experience the existence, or non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence, can neither be affirmed nor denied, so in a similar way, but one leading to contrary results, the Syâdvâda declares that 'you can affirm the existence of a thing from one point of view (syâd asti), deny it from another (syâd nâsti); and affirm both existence and non-existence with reference to it at different times (syâd asti nâsti). If you should think of affirming existence and non-existence at the same time from the same point of view, you must say that the thing cannot be spoken of (syâd avaktavyah). Similarly, under certain circumstances, the affirmation of existence is not possible
[paragraph continues] (syâd asti avaktavyah); of non-existence (syân nâsti avaktavyah); and also of both (syâd asti nâsti avaktavyah) 1.'
This is the famous Saptabhaṅgînaya of the Gainas. Would any philosopher have enunciated such truisms, unless they served to silence some dangerous opponents? The subtle discussions of the Agnostics had probably bewildered and misled many of their contemporaries. Consequently the Syâdvâda must have appeared to them as a happy way leading out of the maze of the Agñânavâda. It was the weapon with which the Agnostics assailed the enemy, turned against themselves. Who knows how many of their followers went over to Mahâvîra's creed convinced by the truth of the Saptabhaṅgînaya!
We can trace, I imagine, the influence of Agnosticism also in the doctrine of the Buddha about the Nirvâna, as it is stated in Pâli books. Professor Oldenberg was the first to draw attention to the decisive passages which prove beyond the possibility of doubt that the Buddha declined answering the question whether the Tathâgata (i.e. the liberated soul, or rather principle of individuality) is after death or not. If the public of his time had not been accustomed to be told that some things, and those of the greatest interest, were beyond the ken of the human mind, and had not acquiesced in such answers, it certainly would not have lent a willing ear to a religious reformer who declined to speak out on what in Brahmanical philosophy is considered the end and goal of all speculations. As it is, Agnosticism seems to have prepared the way for the Buddhist doctrine of the Nirvâna 2. It is worthy of note
that in a dialogue between king Pasênadi and the nun Khêmâ, told in the Samyutta Nikâya, and translated by Oldenberg, the king puts his questions about the existence or non-existence of the Tathâgata after death in the same formulas which Sañgaya is made to use in the passage translated above from the Sâmaññaphala Sutta.
In support of my assumption that the Buddha was influenced by contemporary Agnosticism, I may adduce a tradition incorporated in the Mahâvagga I, 23 and 24. There we are told that the most distinguished pair of his disciples, Sâriputta and Moggalâna, had, previously to their conversion, been adherents of Sañgaya, and had brought over to Buddha 250 disciples of their former teacher. This happened not long after Buddha's reaching Bôdhi, i.e. at the very beginning of the new sect, when its founder must have been willing, in order to win pupils, to treat prevalent opinions with all due consideration.
The greatest influence on the development of Mahâvîra's doctrines must, I believe, be ascribed to Gôsâla, the son of Makkhali. A history of his life, contained in the Bhagavatî XV, I, has been briefly translated by Hoernle in the Appendix to his translation of the Uvâsaga Dasâo. It is there recorded that Gôsâla lived six years together with Mahâvîra as his disciple, practising asceticism, but afterwards separated from him, started a Law of his own, and set up as a Gina, the leader of the Âgîvikas. The Buddhist records, however, speak of him as the successor of Nanda Vakkha and Kisa Samkikka, and of his sect, the akêlaka paribbâgakas, as a long-established order of monks. We have no reason to doubt the statement of the Gainas, that Mahâvîra and Gôsâla for some time practised austerities together; but the relation between them probably was different from what the Gainas would have us believe. I suppose, and shall now bring forward some arguments in favour of my opinion, that Mahâvîra and Gôsâla associated
with the intention of combining their sects and fusing them into one. The fact that these two teachers lived together for a long period, presupposes, it would appear, some similarity between their opinions. I have already pointed out above, in the note on p. xxvi, that the expression sabbê sattâ sabbê pânâ sabbê bhûtâ sabbê gîvâ is common to both Gôsâla and the Gainas, and from the commentary we learn that the division of animals into êkêndriyas, dvîndriyas, &c., which is so common in Gaina texts, was also used by Gôsâla. The curious and almost paradoxical Gaina doctrine of the six Lêsyâs closely resembles, as Professor Leumann was the first to perceive, Gôsâla's division of mankind into six classes; but in this particular I am inclined to believe that the Gainas borrowed the idea from the Âgîvikas and altered it so as to bring it into harmony with the rest of their own doctrines. With regard to the rules of conduct the collective evidence obtainable is such as to amount nearly to proof that Mahâvîra borrowed the more rigid rules from Gôsâla. For as stated in the Uttarâdhyayana XXIII, 13, p. 121, the Law of Pârsva allowed monks to wear an under and upper garment, but the Law of Vardhamâna forbade clothes. A term 1 for naked friar, frequently met with in the Gaina Sûtras, is akêlaka, literally 'unclothed.' Now the Buddhists distinguish between Akêlakas and Niganthas; e.g. in Buddhaghôsa's commentary on the Dhammapadam 2 it is said of some Bhikkhus that they gave the preference to the Niganthas before the Akêlakas, because the latter are stark naked (sabbasô apatikkhannâ), while the Niganthas use some sort of cover 3 'for the sake of decency,' as was wrongly assumed by those Bhikkhus. The Buddhists denote
by Akêlaka the followers of Makkhali Gôsâla and his two predecessors Kisa Samkikka and Nanda Vakkha, and have preserved an account of their religious practices in the Magghima Nikâya 36. There Sakkaka, the son of a Nigantha, whom we are already acquainted with, explains the meaning of kâyabhâvanâ, bodily purity, by referring to the conduct of the Akêlakas. Some details of Sakkaka's account are unintelligible in the absence of a commentary, but many are quite clear, and bear a close resemblance to well-known Gaina usages. Thus the Akêlakas, like the Gaina monks, may not accept an invitation for dinner; they are forbidden food that is abhihata or uddissakata, which terms are, in all likelihood, identical with adhyâhrita and auddêsika of the Gainas (see p. 132, note); they are not allowed to eat meat or to drink liquor. 'Some beg only in one house and accept but one morsel of food, some in more up to seven; some live upon one donation of food, some on more up to seven.' Similar to these are some practices of Gaina monks described in the Kalpa Sûtra, 'Rules for Yatis,' 26, part i, p. 300, and below, p. 176 f., verses 15 and 19. The following practice of the Akêlakas is identically the same as that observed by the Gainas: 'some eat but one meal every day, or every second day 1, &c., up to every half month.' All the rules of the Akêlakas are either identical with those of the Gainas or extremely like them, and dictated, so to say, by the same spirit. And still Sakkaka does not quote the Niganthas as a standard of 'bodily purity,' though he was the son of a Nigantha, and therefore must have known their religious practices. This curious fact may most easily be accounted for by our assuming that the original Niganthas, of whom the Buddhist records usually speak, were not the section of the church, which submitted to the more rigid rules of Mahâvîra, but those followers of Pârsva, who,
without forming a hostile party, yet continued, I imagine, to retain within the united church some particular usages of the old one 1. As those rigid rules formed no part of the ancient creed, and Mahâvîra, therefore, must have introduced them, it is probable that he borrowed them from the Akêlakas or Âgîvikas, the followers of Gôsâla, with whom he is said to have lived in close companionship for six years practising austerities. We may regard Mahâvîra's adoption of some religious ideas and practices of the Âgîvikas as concessions made to them in order to win over Gôsâla and his disciples. This plan seems to have succeeded for some time; but at last the allied teachers quarrelled, it may be supposed, on the question who was to be the leader of the united sects. Mahâvîra's position apparently was strengthened by his temporary association with Gôsâla, but the latter seems to have lost by it, if we are to believe the account of the Gainas, and his tragic end must have been a severe blow to the prospects of his sect.
Mahâvîra probably borrowed much more from other sects than we shall ever be able to prove. It must have been easy to add new doctrines to the Gaina creed, as it scarcely forms a system in the true sense of the word. Each sect, or fraction of a sect, which was united with the Gaina church by the successful policy of Mahâvîra 2, may have brought with it some of its favourite speculations, and most probably its favourite saints too, who were recognised as Kakravartins or Tîrthakaras. This is, of course, a mere conjecture of mine; but it would account for the strange hagiology of the Gainas, and in the absence of any trace of direct evidence we are driven to rely upon guesses, and those deserve the preference which are the most
plausible. For the rest, however, of the hypotheses which I have tried to establish in the preceding pages, I claim a higher degree of probability. For on the one hand I do no violence to the tradition of the Gainas, which in the absence of documents deserves most careful attention, and on the other, I assume but what under the given circumstances would have been most likely to happen. The cardinal feature in my construction of the early history of the Gaina church consists in my turning to account the alleged existence of followers of Pârsva in the time of Mahâvîra, a tradition which seems to be almost unanimously accepted by modern scholars.
If Gainism dates from an early period, and is older than Buddha and Mahâvîra, we may expect to find marks of its antiquity in the character of Gaina philosophy. Such a mark is the animistic belief that nearly everything is possessed of a soul; not only have plants their own souls, but particles of earth, cold water, fire, and wind also. Now ethnology teaches us that the animistic theory forms the basis of many beliefs that have been called the philosophy of savages; that it is more and more relinquished or changed into purer anthropomorphism as civilisation advances. If, therefore, Gaina ethics are for their greater part based on primitive animism, it must have extensively existed in large classes of Indian society when Gainism was first originated. This must have happened at a very early time, when higher forms of religious beliefs and cults had not yet, more generally, taken hold of the Indian mind.
Another mark of antiquity Gainism has in common with the oldest Brahmanical philosophies, Vêdânta and Sâṅkhya. For at this early epoch in the development of metaphysics, the Category of Quality is not yet clearly and distinctly conceived, but it is just evolving, as it were, out of the Category of Substance: things which we recognise as qualities are constantly mistaken for and mixed up with substances. Thus in the Vêdânta the highest Brahman is not possessed of pure existence, intellect, and joy as qualities of his nature, but Brahman is existence, intellect, and
joy itself. In the Sâṅkhya the nature of purusha or soul is similarly defined as being intelligence or light; and the three gunas are described as goodness, energy, and delusion, or light, colour, and darkness; yet these gunas are not qualities in our sense of the word, but, as Professor Garbe adequately calls them, constituents of primitive matter. It is quite in accordance with this way of thinking that the ancient Gaina texts usually speak only of substances, dravyas, and their development or modifications, paryâyas; and when they mention gunas, qualities, besides, which however is done but rarely in the Sûtras and regularly in comparatively modern books only, this seems to be a later innovation due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of Nyâya-Vaisêshika gradually gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus. For at the side of paryâya, development or modification, there seems to be no room for an independent category 'quality,' since paryâya is the state in which a thing, dravya, is at any moment of its existence, and this must, therefore, include qualities, as seems to be actually the view embodied in the oldest text. Another instance of the Gainas applying the category 'substance' to things which are beyond its sphere, and come rather under that of quality,' is seen in their treating merit and demerit, dharma and adharma, as kinds of substances with which the soul comes into contact 1; for they are regarded as coextensive with the world, not unlike space, which even the Vaisêshikas count as a substance. If the categories of substance and quality had already been clearly distinguished from one another, and had been recognised as correlative terms, as they are in Vaisêshika philosophy (which defines substance as the substratum of qualities, and quality as that which is inherent in substance), Gainism would almost certainly not have adopted such confused ideas as those just expounded.
From the preceding remarks it will be evident that I do not agree with Bhandarkar 1, who claims a late origin for Gainism, because, on some points, it entertains the same views as the Vaisêshika. The Vaisêshika philosophy may be briefly described as a philosophical treatment and systematical arrangement of those general concepts and ideas which were incorporated in the language, and formed therefore the mental property common to all who spoke or knew Sanskrit. The first attempts to arrive at such a natural philosophy may have been made at an early epoch; but the perfection of the system, as taught in the aphorisms of Kanâda, could not be reached till after many centuries of patient mental labour and continuous philosophical discussion. In the interval between the origin and the final establishment of the system those borrowings may have taken place of which, rightly or wrongly, the Gainas may be accused. I must, however, remark that Bhandarkar believes the Gainas to hold, on the points presently to be discussed, a view 'which is of the nature of a compromise between the Sâṅkhyas and the Vêdântins on the one hand and the Vaisêshika on the other.' But for our discussion it makes no difference whether direct borrowing or a compromise between two conflicting views be assumed. The points in question are the following: (1) both Gainism and Vaisêshika embrace the Kriyâvâda, i.e. they maintain that the soul is directly affected by actions, passions, &c.; (2) both advocate the doctrine of asatkârya, i.e. that the product is different from its material cause, while the Vedanta and Sâṅkhya hold that they are the same (satkârya); (g) that they distinguish qualities from their substratum (d navy a). The latter item has been discussed above; we have to deal, therefore, with the first two only. It will be seen that the opinions under (1) and (2) are the common-sense views; for that we are directly affected by passions, and that the product is different from its cause, e.g. the tree from the seed, will always and everywhere be the primâ faciê conclusion
of an unbiassed mind, or rather will appear as the simple statement of what common experience teaches. Such opinions cannot be regarded as characteristic marks of a certain philosophy, and their occurrence in another system need not be explained by the assumption of borrowing. The case would be different if a paradoxical opinion were found in two different schools; for a paradoxical opinion is most likely the product of but one school, and, when once established, it may be adopted by another. But such opinions of the Vaisêshika, as are the result of a peculiar train of reasoning, e.g. that space (dis) and air (âkâsa) are two separate substances, do not recur in Gainism. For in it, as well as in the older Brahmanical systems, Vêdânta and Sâṅkhya, space and air are not yet distinguished from one another, but âkâsa is made to serve for both.
Some other instances of difference in fundamental doctrines between Vaisêshikas and Gainas are, that according to the former the souls are infinite and all-pervading, while to the latter they are of limited dimensions, and that the Vaisêshikas make dharma and adharma qualities of the soul, while, as has been said above, the Gainas look on them as a sort of substances. In one point, however, there is some resemblance between a paradoxical Vaisêshika opinion and a distinct Gaina doctrine. According to the Vaisêshika there are four kinds of bodies: bodies of earth, as those of men, animals, &c.; bodies of water in the world of Varuna; bodies of fire in the world of Agni; and bodies of wind in the world of Vâyu. This curious opinion has its counterpart in Gainism; for the Gainas, too, assume Earth-bodies, Water-bodies, Fire-bodies, and Wind-bodies. However, these elementary bodies are the elements or the most minute particles of them, inhabited by particular souls. This hylozoistic doctrine is, as I have said above, the outcome of primitive animism, while the Vaisêshika opinion, though probably derived from the same current of thought, is an adaptation of it to popular mythology. I make no doubt that the Gaina opinion is much more primitive and
belongs to an older stage in the development of philosophical thought than the Vaisêshika assumption of four kinds of bodies.
Though I am of opinion that between Vaisêshika and Gainism no such connection existed as could be proved by borrowings of the one system from the other, still I am ready to admit that they are related to each other by a kind of affinity of ideas. For the fundamental ideas of the Vêdântins and Sâṅkhyas go directly counter to those of the Gainas, and the latter could not adopt them without breaking with their religion. But they could go a part of their way together with the Vaisêshika, and still retain their religious persuasion. We need, therefore, not wonder that among the writers on the Nyâya-Vaisêshika some names of Gainas occur. The Gainas themselves go still farther, and maintain that the Vaisêshika philosophy was established by a schismatical teacher of theirs, Khaluya Rôhagutta of the Kausika Gôtra, with whom originated the sixth schism of the Gainas, the Trairâsika-matam, in 544 A. V. 1 (18 A. D.) The details of this system given in the Âvasyaka, vv. 77-83, are apparently reproduced from Kanâda's Vaisêshika Darsana; for they consist in the enumeration of the six (not seven) categories with their subdivisions, among which that of qualities contains but seventeen items (not twenty-four), and those identical with Vaisêshika Darsana I, 1, 6.
I believe that in this case, as in many others, the Gainas claim more honour than is their due in connecting every Indian celebrity with the history of their creed. My reason for doubting the correctness of the above Gaina legend is the following. The Vaisêshika philosophy is reckoned as one of the orthodox Brahmanical philosophies, and it has chiefly, though not exclusively, been cultivated by orthodox Hindus. We have, therefore, no reason for doubting that they have misstated the name and Gôtra of the author of the Sûtras, viz. Kanâda of the Kâsyapa Gôtra. No trace
has been found in Brahmanical literature that the name of the real author of the Vaisêshika was Rôhagupta, and his Gôtra the Kausika Gôtra; nor can Rôhagupta and Kanâda be taken as different names of the same person, because their Gôtras also differ. Kânâda, follower of Kanâda, means etymologically crow-eater, owl; hence his system has been nicknamed Aulûkya Darsana, owl-philosophy 1. In Rôhagupta's second name, Khuluya, which stands for Shadulûka 2, allusion is made to the 'owl,' probably to the Kânâdas; but the Gainas refer ulûka to the Gôtra of the Rôhagupta, viz. Kausika 3, which word also means owl. As the unanimous tradition of the Brahmans deserves the preference before that of the Gainas, we can most easily account for the latter by assuming that Rôhagupta did not invent, but only adopted the Vaisêshika philosophy to support his schismatical views.
About the two works translated in this volume, the Uttarâdhyayana and Sûtrakritâṅga, I have little to add to the remarks of Professor Weber in the Indische Studien, vol. xvi, p. 259 ff., and vol. xvii, p. 43 ff. The Sûtrakritâṅga is probably the older of the two, as it is the second Aṅga, and the Aṅgas obtain the foremost rank among the canonical books of the Gainas, while the Uttarâdhyayana, the first Mûlasûtra, belongs to the last section of the Siddhânta. According to the summary in the fourth Aṅga the object of the Sûtrakritâṅga is to fortify young monks against the heretical opinions of alien teachers, to confirm them in the right faith, and to lead them to the highest good. This description is correct on the whole, but not exhaustive, as will be seen by going over our table of contents. The work opens with the refutation of heretical doctrines, and the same object is again treated at greater length in the
[paragraph continues] First Lecture of the Second Book. It is followed in the First Book by Lectures on a holy life in general, on the difficulties a monk has to overcome, especially the temptations thrown in his way, the punishment of the unholy, and the praise of Mahâvîra as the standard of righteousness. Then come some Lectures on cognate subjects. The Second Book, which is almost entirely in prose, treats of similar subjects, but without any apparent connection of its parts. It may therefore be considered as supplementary, and as a later addition to the First Book. The latter was apparently intended as a guide for young monks 1. Its form, too, seems adapted to this purpose; for it lays some claim to poetical art in the variety of the metres employed, and in the artificial character of some verses. It may, therefore, be considered as the composition of one author, while the Second Book is a collection of tracts which treat on the subjects discussed in the first.
The Uttarâdhyayana resembles the Sûtrakritâṅga with regard to its object and part of the subjects treated; but it is of greater extent than the original part of the Sûtrakritâṅga, and the plan of the work is carried out with more skill. Its intention is to instruct a young monk in his principal duties, to commend an ascetic life by precepts and examples, to warn him against the dangers in his spiritual career, and to give some theoretical information. The heretical doctrines are only occasionally alluded to, not fully discussed; apparently the dangers expected from that quarter grew less in the same measure as time advanced and the institutions of the sect were more firmly established. Of more importance to a young monk seems to have been an accurate knowledge of animate and inanimate things, as a rather long treatise on this subject has been added at the end of the book.--Though there is an apparent plan in the selection and arrangement of the single Lectures, still it is open to doubt whether they were all composed by one
author, or only selected from the traditional literature, written or oral, which among the Gainas, as everywhere else, must have preceded the formation of a canon. I am inclined to adopt the latter alternative, because there is a greater variety of treatment and style in the different parts than seems compatible with the supposition of one author, and because a similar origin must be assumed for many works of the present canon.
At what time the works under discussion were composed or brought into their present shape is a problem which cannot be satisfactorily solved. As, however, the reader of the present volume will naturally expect the translator to give expression to his personal conviction on this point, I give my opinion with all reserve, viz. that most parts, tracts, or treatises of which the canonical books consist, are old; that the redaction of the Aṅgas took place at an early period (tradition places it under Bhadrabâhu); that the other works of the Siddhânta were collected in course of time, probably in the first centuries before our era, and that additions or alterations may have been made in the canonical works till the time of their first edition under Devardhiganin (980 AV. = 454 A. D.)
I have based my translation of the Uttarâdhyayana and Sûtrakritâṅga on the text adopted by the oldest commentators I could consult. This text differs little from that of the MSS. and the printed editions. I had prepared a text of my own from some MSS. at my disposal, and this has served to check the printed text.
The Calcutta edition of the Uttarâdhyayana (Samvat 1936 = 1879 A. D.) contains, besides a Guzeratî gloss, the Sûtradîpikâ of Lakshmîvallabha, pupil of Lakshmîkîrtiganin of the Kharatara Gakkha. Older than this commentary is the Tîkâ of Dêvêndra, which I have made my principal guide. It was composed in Samvat 1179 or 1123 A. D., and is confessedly an abstract from Sântyâkârya's Vritti, which I have not used. But I have had at my disposal an illuminated old MS. of the Avakûri, belonging to the
[paragraph continues] Strassburg University Library. This work is apparently an abstract from the Vritti of Sântyâkârya, as in a great many passages it almost verbally agrees with Dêvêndra's work.
The Bombay edition of the Sûtrakritâṅga (Samvat 1936 or 1880 A. D.) contains three commentaries: (1) Sîlâṅka's Tîkâ, in which is incorporated Bhadrabâhu's Niryukti. This is the oldest commentary extant; but it was not without predecessors, as Sîlâṅka occasionally alludes to old commentators. Sîlâṅka lived in the second half of the ninth century A. D., as he is said to have finished his commentary on the Âkârâṅga Sûtra in the Saka year 798 or 876 A. D. (2) The Dîpika, an abstract from the last by Harshakula, which was composed in Samvat 1583 or 1517 AD. I have also used a MS. of the Dîpika in my possession. (3) Pâsakandra's Bâlâvabôdha, a Guzeratî gloss.--My principal guide was, of course, Sîlâṅka; when he and Harshakula agree, I refer to them in my notes as the 'commentators;' I name Sîlâṅka when his remark in question has been omitted by Harshakula, and I quote the latter when he gives some original matter of interest. I may add that one of my MSS. is covered with marginal and interlinear glosses which have now and then given me some help in ascertaining the meaning of the text.
I may here add a remark on the Parable of the Three Merchants, see p. 29 f., which agrees with Matthew xxv. 14 and Luke xix. 11. It seems, however, to have had a still greater resemblance to the version of the parable in The Gospel according to the Hebrews, as will appear from the following passage from Eusebius’ Theophania (ed. Migne's Patrologia Graeca, iv. 155), translated by Nicholson, 'The Gospel according to the Hebrews (London, 1879): The Gospel, which comes to us in Hebrew characters, has directed the threat not against the hider, but against the abandoned liver. For it has included three servants, one which devoured the substance with harlots and flute-women, one which multiplied, and one which hid the talent: one was accepted, one only blamed, and one shut up in prison.' I owe this quotation to my colleague Arnold Meyer.
Taking into consideration (1) that the Gaina version contains only the essential elements of the parable, which in the Gospels are developed into a full story; and (2) that it is expressly stated in the Uttarâdhyayana VII, 15 that 'this parable is taken from common life,' I think it probable that the Parable of the Three Merchants was invented in India, and not in Palestine.
xiii:1 Das Aupapâtika Sûtra, in the Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. viii; and Dasavaikâlika Sûtra und Niryukti, in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. xlvi.
xiii:2 The Uvâsaga Dasâo: (in the Bibliotheca Indica), vol. i. Text and Commentary, Calcutta, 1890; vol. ii. Translation, 1888.
xiii:3 Berlin, 1888 and 1892.
xiii:4 In the Indische Studien, vol. xvi, p. 211 ff., and xvii, p. 1 ff.; translated in the Indian Antiquary and edited separately, Bombay, 1893.
xiii:5 In the Actes du VI Congrès International des Orientalistes, section Arienne, p. 469 ff., in the 5th and 6th vols. of the Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, and in the 48th vol. of the Journal of the German Oriental Society.
xiv:1 The Parisishtaparvan by Hêmakandra, Bibliotheca Indica.
xiv:2 Denkschriften der philos.-histor. Classe der kaiserl. Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. xxxvii, p. 171 ff.
xiv:3 Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vols. ii and iii. Epigraphia Indica, vols. i and ii.
xiv:4 Bangalore, 1889.
xiv:5 The Religions of India. Bulletin des Religions de l’Inde, 1889-94.
xiv:6 Über die indische Secte der Jaina. Wien, 1887.
xiv:7 Report for 1883-84.
xiv:8 Nigantha is apparently the original form of the word, since it is thus spelled in the Asôka inscription, in Pâli, and occasionally by the Gainas, though the phonetic laws of all three idioms would have given preference to the form niggantha, the more frequent spelling in Gaina works.
xv:1 There are apparently two persons of this name. The other Abhaya, a son of king Srênika, was a patron of the Gainas, and is frequently mentioned in their legends and in the canonical books. In the Magghima Nikâya 58 (Abhayakumâra Sutta) it is related that the Nigantha Nâtaputta made him engage in a disputation with Buddha. The question was so adroitly framed that whether the answer was Yes or No, it involved Buddha in self-contradiction. But the plan did not succeed, and Abhaya was converted by Buddha. There is nothing in this account to elucidate the doctrines of Nâtaputta.
xvi:1 The name Sîha occurs in the Bhagavatî (Calcutta edition, p. 1267, see Hoernle, Uvâsaga Dasâo Appendix, p. 10) as that of a disciple of Mahâvîra; but as he was a monk, he cannot be identified with his namesake in the Mahâvagga.
xix:1 Sumaṅgala Vilâsinî, p. 119 of the Pali Text Society edition.
xx:1 Page 57 of the edition in the Pali Text Society.
xx:2 The translations of Gogerly and of Burnouf in Grimblot, Sept Suttas Pâlis, were made without the help of a commentary, and may, therefore, be passed by. It is, however, open to doubt whether Buddhaghôsa has drawn his information from genuine tradition, or had to rely on conjectures of his own.
xx:3 See my paper, 'On Mahâvîra and his Predecessors,' in the Indian Antiquary, IX, 158 ff., where some of the above problems have been treated.
xxi:1 In the Râgaprasnî Pârsva has a discussion with king Paêsi and converts him, see Actes du VI Congrès International des Orientalistes, vol. iii, P. 490 ff.
xxii:1 See my paper on the origin of the Svêtâmbara and Digambara sects in the Journal of the German Oriental Society, vol. xxxviii, p. 1 ff.
xxiii:1 Sâmaññaphala Sutta, Dîgha Nikâya II, 20.
xxiii:2 Sumaṅgala Vilâsinî, p. 162. Buddhaghôsa expressly states that Gôsâla reckoned the Niganthas lower than his own lay disciples, who form the fourth class.--As Buddhaghôsa does not take umbrage at Gôsâla's reckoning the Bhikkhus still lower, it is clear that he did not identify the Bhikkhus with the Buddhist monks.
xxiii:3 See p. 250 of the Pali Text Society edition.
xxiv:1 Âkâsa; it is not reckoned as a fifth element in the Buddhist account, but it is so in that of the Gainas, see below, p. 343, and p. 237, verse 15. This is a verbal, rather than a material difference.
xxiv:2 I put here the original texts side by side so that their likeness may be more obvious:
âsandipañkamâ purisâ matam âdâya gakkhanti yâva âlâhanâ padâni paññâpenti, kâpôtakâni atthîni bhavanti, bhassantâऽhutiyô.
âdahanâe parêhi niggai, aganigghâmitê sarîre kavôtavannâim atthîni âsandîpañkamâ purisâ gâmam pakkâgakkhanti.
xxiv:3 Loc. cit., p. 56.
xxv:1 It is worthy of remark that the Vêdântists play no conspicuous part, if any, among Buddha's opponents. As they were, however, the foremost of Brahmanical philosophers, we must conclude that Brahmans of learning held aloof from the classes of society to which the new religion appealed.
xxv:2 Page 345 f., see also p. 239.
xxv:3 Grimblot, Sept Suttas Pâlis, p. 170.
xxvi:1 In the original: sabbê sattâ, sabbê pânâ, sabbê bhûtâ, sabbê gîvâ. The same enumeration frequently occurs in Gaina Sûtras, and has, in my translation, been abbreviated in all classes of living beings.' Buddhaghôsa's explanation has been thus rendered by Hoernle, Uvâsaga Dasâo, Appendix II, p. 16: 'In the term all beings (sabbê sattâ) he comprises camels, oxen, asses, and other animals without exception. The term all sensive beings (sabbê pânâ) he uses to denote those with one sense, those with two senses, and so forth. The term all generated beings (sabbê bhûtâ) he uses with reference to those that are generated or produced from an egg or from the womb. The term all living beings (sabbê gîvâ) he uses with reference to rice, barley, wheat, and so forth; in these he conceives that there is life, because it is their nature to grow.'
xxvi:2 See pp. 83, 291, 316, 385.
xxvi:3 Grimblot, l.c., p. 174.
xxviii:1 Bhandarkar, Report for 1883-4, p. 95 f.
xxviii:2 The reticence of Buddha on the nature of the Nirvâna may have been wise at his time; but it was fraught with very important results for the development of the church. For his followers, having to hold their own against such split-hair dialecticians as the Brahmanical philosophers, were almost driven to enunciate more explicit ideas about the great problem which the founder of the church had left unsolved. The tendency to supply the crowning stone to an edifice which appeared to have been left unfinished by the hand of the master, led to the division of the community into numerous p. xxix sects soon after the Nirvâna of Buddha. We need not wonder therefore that in Ceylon, which is at such a distance from the centre of Brahmanical learning, Buddhists could retain the doctrine of the Nirvâna in its original form.
xxx:1 Another term is Ginakalpika, which may be rendered: adopting the standard of the Ginas. The Svêtâmbaras say that the Ginakalpa was early replaced by the Sthavirakalpa, which allows the use of clothes.
xxx:2 Fausböll's edition, p. 398.
xxx:3 The words sêsakam purimasamappitâ va patikkhâdenti are not quite clear, but the contrast leaves no doubt about what is meant. Sêsaka is, I believe, the Pâli for sisnaka. If this is right, the above words may be translated: 'they cover the pudenda wearing (a cloth) about the forepart (of their body).'
xxxi:1 These fasts are called by the Gainas kautthabhatta, khatthabhatta, &c. (see e.g. Aupapâtika Sûtra, ed. Leumann, § 30 I A); and monks observing them, kautthabhattiya, khatthabhattiya, &c. (see e.g. Kalpa Sûtra, 'Rules for Yatis,' § 21 ff.)
xxxii:1 As I have said above and in note 2. p. 119, this difference has probably given rise to the division of the church into Svêtâmbaras and Digambaras. But these two branches have not directly grown out of the party of Pârsva and that of Mahâvîra; for both recognise Mahâvîra as a Tîrthakara.
xxxii:2 Mahâvîra must have been a great man in his way, and an eminent leader among his contemporaries; he owed the position of a Tîrthakara probably not so much to the sanctity of his life, as to his success in propagating his creed.
xxxiv:1 That this was the primitive conception of the Vedic Hindus has been noted by Oldenberg, Die Religion des Veda, p. 317 f.
xxxv:1 See his Report for 1883-84., p. 116 f.
xxxvii:1 See Indische Studien, vol. xvii, p. 116 ff.
xxxviii:1 See my edition of the Kalpa Sûtra, p. 119.
xxxviii:2 Literally Six-owl. The number six refers to the six categories of the Vaisêshika.
xxxviii:3 Part i, p. 290. But in the legend translated by Professor Leumann, l.c., p. 121, his Gôtra is called Khaûlû.
xxxix:1 According to an old tradition (see Indische Studien, vol. xvi, p. 223) the Sûtrakritâṅga is studied in the fourth year after the ordination of a monk.