16. And because (the cause) is perceived in the existence of the effect.
This means--because gold which is the cause is perceived in the existence of its effects, such as earrings and the like; i.e. on account of the recognition of gold which expresses itself in the judgment 'this earring is gold.' We do not on the other hand perceive the presence of clay, and so on, in gold, and so on. The case of the cause and the effect is thus analagous to that of the child and the youth: the word 'effect' denotes nothing else but the causal substance which
has passed over into a different condition. He also who holds the effect to be a new thing acknowledges that the effect is connected with a different state, and as this different state suffices to account for the difference of ideas and words, we are not entitled to assume a new substance which is not perceived. Nor must it be said that the recognition of the gold in the earring is due to generic nature (the two things being different, but having the same generic nature); for we perceive no new substance which could be the abode of the generic character. What we actually perceive is one and the same substance possessing the generic characteristics of gold, first in the causal state and then in the effected state. Nor again can it be said that even on the supposition of difference of substance, recognition of the cause in the effect results from the continuity of the so-called intimate cause (samavâyi-kâra,ina). For where there is difference of substances we do not observe that mere continuity of the abode gives rise to the recognition (of one substance) in the other substance residing in that abode.-But in the case of certain effects, as e.g. scorpions and other vermin which originate from dung, that recognition of the causal substance, i.e. dung (to which you refer as proving the identity of cause and effect), is not observed to take place!--You misstate the case, we reply; here also we do recognise in the effect that substance which is the primal cause, viz. earth.--But in smoke, which is the effect of fire, we do not recognise fire!--True! but this does not disprove our case. Fire is only the operative cause of smoke; for smoke originates from damp fuel joined with fire. That smoke is the effect of damp fuel is proved thereby, as well as that both have smell (which shows them to be alike of the substance of earth).--As thus the identity of the substance is perceived in the effect also, we are entitled to conclude that the difference of ideas and terms rests on difference of state only. The effect, therefore, is non-different from the cause.--This is so for the following reason also.